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ABSTRACT 
Many would hold the First World responsible for Third World poverty. Much was 
written about exploitation of their colonies by the metropolis, and it is worth quickly 
reviewing this and other more recent points of contention. These have included pushing 
the colonies towards specialization in the production of tropical raw materials, 
development of synthetic substitutes as the colonies became restless and then declared 
independence, handling of loans to the Third World, copyright and other means of 
protection of intellectual property, environmental protection. 
While differences between the First and Third Worlds along these lines persist and 
are still prominent in discussion, yet they may be less important than something quite 
different that is holding back the world's poor. That is the example that the First World 
sets in technology, and that the Third World strives to emulate. 
Large projects--steel mills, aircraft factories, an elaborately automated textile 
industry, are not without their attractiveness to the elite of a poor country, as a sign that 
it is catching up, that it need not replicate the labor intensive aspects of the Industrial 
Revolution as it was played through in the West. Yet putting its scarce capital into these 
is a great deal short of optimum allocaiion from a social point of view. Plants built for 
show played no part in the success of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan since World War 11; on 
the other hand they did play a part in the Iran of Shah Pahlevi, and led to the 
displacement of the forward-looking, westernizing Shah by the backward-looking 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
How did the Shah accomplish this unintended outcome of his high-technology 
programs? He did it by devoting too little attention to the little people. He disposed of 
exceptionally large amounts of capital, but it was not enough to create employment 
opportunities for all at the level of technology to which he wanted to jump in one stride. 
Capital was far less available to Japan in the 1950s, but what it had it used to make labor 
productive--starting with agriculture where as in any country a large part of the labor is 
located at the start of industrialization. By raising productivity across the board, 
encouraging artisan industry in the countryside and the city alike, rather than 
concentrating on a few high-tech labor-saving plants, East Asian countries could get their 
whole population into the act, and ultimately progress to a point that in many respects 
is ahead of the West. 
What we know from Iran, Algeria, Egypt, the Philippines, and to some extent Latin 
America is that concentration of production may more quickly attain the appearance of 
development, but the process is unstable. The rural population could be disregarded in 
Adam Smith's day, but in a time of easy communication and irrepressible politicians the 
majority refuse to wait their turn while watching a minority become ostentatiously rich. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE FIRST WORLD: 
HELP OR HINDRANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD? 
Nathan Keyjitz 
The European powers were able to establish dominion over the other 
continents by virtue of their superiority in the technologies of war and of 
production. They used their power to reorient the dominated economies in a 
direction complementary to their own, which meant increase of tropical raw 
materials, and allowing traditional arts of weaving and pottery to decline. 
When they left the colonies their local successors expected the prices of 
peanuts, sisal, and many other products to remain at their high levels, and the 
flow of funds that the foreign masters had reaped could now be allocated to 
development. They were mistaken: laboratories in the rich countries invented 
substitutes for many raw materials and competition among ex-colonies 
intensified, so that most of the profits vanished. 
Tired of hearing about markets, out of their control and seeming always 
to move against them, the reaction of the LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s was to 
protect their finances against the tempting goods of the rich countries, and 
behind high tariffs set up a comfortably noncompeting production system that 
would make them economically autonomous. It took a decade or two for the 
resulting inefficiency to drain out their foreign exchange reserves and then 
exhaust their borrowing capacity. This brought them around to what they had 
been told was the efficient way to run an economy: they lowered tariffs, 
liberalized their foreign exchange rules, and opened their gates to foreign 
investment by the multinational corporations of which they had once been 
suspicious. For some the new economic regime has been a success; for many 
it has brought unexpected difficulties, including some of a social and political 
nature. 
An embarrassing feature of mainstream contemporary social and 
economic theory is that it makes the fate of the poor depend on the increase 
of wealth of those already rich. From the 1930s and up to the 1960s 
employment on public works seemed the right way to help the domestic 
unemployed; such a direct approach is now seen as an error. If the rich are 
taxed to provide direct benefits to the poor, it is said, that will slow down the 
economic growth of the rich, weaken national markets, and so deprive the poor 
of their best chance of selling their labor or their produce and prospering 
independently. The New Deal of the 1930s has given way to supply-side 
economics, in which the poor are to be helped by low interest rates and low 
'Paper written for International Social Science Council, Comparative Research Program on Poverty 
(ISSC/CROP) Conference in Paris, April 16-18, 1993, Professor Else @yen, Chair. 
taxes whose initial beneficiaries are the rich. How much of the resulting 
benefits will trickle down to the poor is debated; the evidence of the past 10 
years in the United States is not enco~raging.~ 
By extension the same applies to the international poor; once the rich 
countries recover from the present depression they will be able to invest in the 
poor countries and buy their goods, and that is the best hope of worldwide 
development. Hence it said not to matter that direct foreign aid and loans are 
less plentiful than they were--such aid has in any case many defects as an 
instrument of development, and is made to look like a holdover from the time 
when the economics of development was less well understood. Continuance 
of the present net payments from the Third World to the First World will 
benefit the former if they jump-start the economies of the latter. Such is the 
argument frequently heard. 
It is the third application of such a justification of temporary inequality-- 
within the poor countries themselves--that will be a concern of this paper. The 
concentration of wealth in many LDCs is admittedly regrettable, but 
nonetheless the rich are in a position to save higher proportions of their 
income than do the poor, and this saving provides the capital for development, 
and ultimately it is development that will alleviate the lot of the poor. The 
wealthy entrepreneur tends to produce by the most advanced and labor saving 
methods; this should be encouraged insofar as learning takes place and the 
methods will diffuse, so that advanced methods of production will ultimately 
benefit everyone. Though no one has any idea of how soon is "ultimately", for 
the short run paying much attention to the poor would be a distraction from 
development. 
The present paper comes to the conclusion that this elite approach, 
irrespective of how sound or unsound it may be as economics, leads to social 
disaster. An alternative route is described that leads through more 
equalitarian growth to a correspondingly more stable, modem and humane 
society. But before getting to that I quickly run through the modem history of 
relations between the West and the rest of the world, that is the ground for a 
lasting suspicion of the West on the one hand, and an intense desire to outdo 
the West on the other. 
'1 am not the first to say this, nor is the statement regarded as radical. Thus Robert M. Solow, "Dr. 
Rivlin's Diagnosis and Mr. Clinton's Remedy, in The$, March 25, 1993, p. 13: 
The widening of inequality is clearly visible in incomes before tax and without income support 
payments. The Reagan-Bush achievement in taking from the poor and giving to the rich made 
things only slightly worse. If that policy had resulted in a resurgence of growth, the net result 
might have been adjudged beneficial. But the supply-side revolution was a dud. 
THE THIRD WORLD 
My use of the word "poor" above to refer to the populations of the LDCs will seem 
politically wrong. In the bright perspective of the years following World War 11, with the 
founding of the United Nations and other institutional changes that were to lead to a 
more secure and more equitable world, the condition of the poor was recognized, but not 
the word. To speak of the "poor" would have been a reversion to 19th and earlier 
century thinking; the word has too much of inevitability about it, too much of "...the poor 
always ye have with you."3 Benefits provided to people who are poor have the flavor of 
charity. No one wanted that except in extreme emergencies, so the word has been 
replaced in postwar documents, at first by "underdeveloped. But that too was found 
offensive, and "less developed took its place, and that in turn gave way to "developing". 
The succession of terms was in search of a word that would suggest a transitional rather 
than a stable condition of low income. Yet in the end none of these seems quite right. 
One word was invented that has been found unobjectionable from the start, that still 
retains its impartiality today, that over the course of 40 years has accumulated no 
unpleasant connotations. That word is Third World. It was coined by Alfred Sauvy, 
French demographer and economist, and first appeared in an article in I'Observateur of 
August 14, 1954, entitled Trois mondes. une plan2te. The time was an early stage of the 
Cold War, just after the death of Stalin. Said Sauvy, 
Nous parlons voluntiers des dew mondes en prCsence, de leur guerre possible, 
de leur coexistence, etc. oubliant trop souvent qu'il en existe un troisii3me, le 
plus important ... C'est l'ensemble de ceux que Yon appelle ... les pays sous- 
dCveloppCs ... ignore, exploitC, mCprisC ... veut, lui aussi, &re quelque chose." 
The word "important" in French means both numerically preponderant, as well as 
important in the English sense, and Sauvy had reference to both. No one will question 
the numerical dominance of the Third World over the First World (the market 
economies) and the Second or Socialist World, but its dominance in other senses, 
particularly social and political? Sauvy wanted to form our minds to the idea that the 
poor countries were a problem, perhaps the chief problem, of the rich countries, whether 
the latter realized it or not. 
DEVELOPMENT A CHANGED RELATION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF 
COUNTRIES 
At the time Sauvy wrote the First World expected to provide the aid required for 
development, and the poor countries would happily accept the aid and accordingly 
develop rapidly. With a big push the Development Decade, as the 1960s were called, 
would see most of the poor countries launched on the road to durable prosperity; they 
'We gladly speak of two worlds facing each other, of their possible war, of their coexistence, etc., 
forgetting too often that there is a third one, the most important ... That is the group of those that are 
called ... the underdeveloped countries ... ignored, exploited, scorned ... that want, they too, to be recognized. 
would have "taken off? into an irreversible course of rising income. The reality has not 
been so smooth--but one feature remains, embedded in Sauvy's expression 'Third World": 
the poor countries can only be understood in relation to the industrial countries. 
Those relations are complex, and no short paper can hope to provide an exhaustive 
inventory. They include the fact that on the whole the leaders of the Third World get 
along rather well with the foreigners from the rich countries, and on the whole those 
leaders benefit conspicuously from the contacts. Even if these were traditional leaders 
that would be bad enough, in the view of those not benefitting, but in many instances 
they are upstarts as well, and upstarts installed by the First World. 
My argument will be that these relations have been and are determined by 
technology; if the West has taught the world anything, starting with its first use of 
gunpowder in war in the 14th century, it is that the country that is technologically ahead 
is the master. This lesson of history has been so well learned that it is leading many of 
the LDCs into a path of development that can prove socially disastrous. 
COLONIAL HISTORY WEIGHS ON THE LDCS' 
While autocratic rule over alien peoples, even the establishment of a world empire, 
goes back at least to Alexander the Great, modern imperialism with its economic purpose 
has a much shorter history. It started in the 16th century with the Portuguese and 
Spanish, followed by the Dutch, the English and the French, first exploring and then 
taking over the Americas, Africa and much of Asia. The sailing ship, that efficiently 
concentrated energy and put more at the disposal of each worker than had ever before 
been possible, and the compass that permitted navigation out of sight of land, along with 
gunpowder that changed the nature of warfare, were the main technical innovations. By 
the time it was at its height colonial administration was facilitated by two civilian 
innovations: the steamship and the telegraph. 
One has to emphasize technology in such a history, because only its mastery of a few 
such devices enabled a small peninsula at the western end of the Eurasian continent to 
take over the rest of the planet. For the efficiency of its day-to-day economy as well as 
political and military organization, not to mention the elegances and the arts of 
civilization, East Asia was far ahead of ~ u r o p e . ~  And if the British came to worldwide 
supremacy over their European rivals as well as over indigenous peoples, it was again less 
'Most of the present LDCs have been through a colonial experience, ruled by a colonial power for a 
longer or shorter time. In the case of Indonesia foreign rule over a part or a whole went on for a good part 
of three centuries; Burma had colonial rule for less than one century. China was never quite part of an alien 
colonial empire, but it certainly endured European and Japanese control of some of its affairs during a good 
part of the 19th century. Egypt was colored red on the maps as a British "possession" though it was not 
under as direct rule as was India. Thailand was always free. 
When the first British envoy approached the Emperor of China and proposed trade between the two 
countries he was told that China would be generous in offering the products of its civilization to Britain, but 
there was nothing that the British could possibly offer in return that had any value for the Chinese, so far 
in advance were they. 
through a superior civilization than because they were several steps ahead in a few key 
technologies. 
So both the assembly of empires, and the rivalry of European imperialisms hinged 
on technological superiority in peace and in war. I repeat that this is to be emphasized 
because it was what the Third World has principally learned from history, and the lesson 
is leading many of the new countries along a track of development whose endpoint we 
now know to be unsatisfactory. 
COLONIES AN ABERRATION 
Though Europe as a whole did not realize that imperialism was unprofitable until 
near the middle of the 20th century, good minds had seen that truth two centuries earlier. 
Adam smith7 told his contemporaries that colonies are an economic error, the money 
spent in their administration wasted, any advantage they could provide to the homeland 
was obtainable much less expensively by trade. Marx tended to concur: though colonies 
were probably of some advantage to capitalism, they were of marginal imp~rtance.~ Thus 
19th century intellectuals saw colonies as unessential, as useless expense. Schumpeter in 
this century agreed with these writers; for him capitalism was essentially anti-colonial, the 
colonies as anachronistic militarism surviving from the feudal past? 
To extract economic advantage the metropolis had to fashion colonial production 
to a form complementary to metropolitan, which translated into having the colony export 
the raw materials for metropolitan manufactures, stopping well short of producing the 
final goods. India's textile and other ancient industries produced as fine cloths as any 
known up to their time, of which British machine products were cheap imitations. 
Nonetheless it was the cheaper goods that won out and some of India's richest and most 
ancient handwork industries were abandoned. The workers who had produced these lost 
their economic base. 
The division of labor sponsored by the European rulers did not require highly 
trained indigenous professionals in the colonies; planting sugarcane or peanuts does not 
need mathematics or even literacy. Moreover educating the colonials was risky. By 1950, 
after 300 years of colonial rule, there may have been fewer than 1000 college graduates 
in Indonesia's population of 80 million; Britain did better, with the institution in India 
after 1835 of a western-type educational system, but one hardly designed for the masses; 
Belgium in the Congo did much worse than Holland. France went the furthest towards 
making its culture available to colonial subjects. 
The colonial masters had little wish to disturb the indigenous culture. Freezing the 
culture would suppress, or at least defer, the sort of ferment that everywhere comes with 
 d dam Smith. 1776. An Enauirv into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
'Michael Twaddle. 1985. Imperialism. Page 377 in Kuper and Kuper, eds., The Social S c i e n ~  
Encvclopedia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
'Joseph A. Schumpeter. 1951 [1919]. Imperialism and Social Classes. Oxford. 
the incipient stages of development, and that the colonial rulers feared. The process by 
which the Dutch administration tended to prevent the sort of evolution in politics and 
society that would have otherwise occurred is described for Indonesia by Kahin of 
Cornell." The colonial powers on the one hand set up a dynamic economic process in 
their own interest, and at the same time imposed a degree of cultural and political 
inertia. 
The one positive feature of the colonial epoch, common to all cases with no 
exception, was that it nourished an intense desire for independence. And after attaining 
that, the new countries sought to make the independence real by an economic 
development that would put them on the level of the former rulers. Just as the European 
bourgeoisie was inspired to imitate and supplant their aristocracy, so the newly freed elite 
wanted to supplant the one-time colonial masters, and also to take over some of their key 
traits." 
AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
Having transformed the colonies into raw material producers for the world market 
where before they had been largely subsistence farmers, Europeans then quit the 
colonies, willingly in the case of Mauritius, peacefully enough in Ceylon, after a struggle 
in Indonesia from 1945 that ended with the Round Table Agreement transferring 
sovereignty in 1949. In Vietnam the war between the Viet Cong and the French lasted 
from 1946 to 1954. In Algeria it took a war from 1954 to 1962, with over 100,000 Muslim 
deaths and 10,000 French, before de Gaulle withdrew and left the National Liberation 
Front (FLN) in charge. 
Trade should have allowed the new countries to continue the highly solvent 
productive arrangements of the colonies; all that need have changed would have been the 
substitution of democratic native governance for the alien autocrats, and the channelling 
of the receipts into investment for development rather than into the standard of living 
of the mother country. For a short while immediately after the ending of World War I1 
that was more or less what happened. The developing countries had large financial 
reserves accumulated from sales of their produce during the War, and their incomes were 
high during the commodity boom of the Korean War. But that did not last long. 
THE DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL ADVANCE IN THE WORLD 
Germany had pioneered the production of tropical goods in the laboratory; in the 
19th century its chemist Liebig had synthesized indigo, and at one stroke Liebig's aniline 
dyes destroyed the commercial value of thousands of hectares of British plantation in 
India. Just before the last War rubber was synthesized; foam rubber began to take the 
place of kapok for cushions. The list of substitutions is long: artificial sweeteners for 
sugar, nylon for sisal in ropes, Coca-Cola for tea, glass fibers for copper wires in 
loGeorge McT. Kahin. 1 9 5 2 . 5 .  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
"Yet the sense of challenge was also felt by Japan, that had never been under colonial rule, though it had 
been subjected to some rude indignities. 
communication. Aluminum cans substituted for tin-plated steel, and where plating 
survived a new technique for coating uses much less tin. The net effect of all this has 
been a strong movement of the terms of trade against the LDCs, applying to all 
commodities except oil. And the process continues; as late as 1981 the largest consumer 
of the world's sugar was Coca Cola. A well-known Asian journal complains: 
That year [1981], in a move rapidly emulated by other soft-drink giants, Coke 
began to shift its sweetener from sugar to corn-syrup. ... Advances in plastics, 
synthetic fibres, food chemistry and biotechnology are bringing far-reaching 
changes to other commodity markets. The cumulative impact of these 
substitutions is to toss tens of millions of Third World workers into the margins 
of the marketplace.12 
Technology was everywhere working against the former colonies. One need not be 
surprised that President Soekarno expressed Indonesia's helplessness in the face of this 
by calling for a 10-year international moratorium on invention; if you really want to help 
us, he seemed to be saying, just leave technologies where they are until we catch up, so 
that from then on the race will be reasonably fair and equal. 
Those in the metropolis explained that the process was in the natural course of 
evolution; it was not that they wanted to pay less for rubber or coffee or peanuts, but like 
other participants they had to follow the market. They were as helpless before this 
impersonal process as were the ex-colonies. 
Was it the access of the colonies to independence that incited the metropolis to the 
technical changes? Or was it the other way round--that the impending inventions made 
the colonies not worth the cost of holding? I incline to the latter connection, but proof 
of causation between two changes proceeding simultaneously is hard to come by. 
Whatever the cause, let no one think that the process is at an end. Read two 
distinguished writers on the subject: 
Some say that chocolate can soon be produced by a biotechnological process, 
so there is no more need to have cocoa plantations. If they can do this with 
cocoa, why not with coffee, vanilla, and other aromatic products?13 
SUCCESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE LDCS 
In a typical feedback sequence, the falling prices of their products made for more 
intense sales competition among the ex-colonies. Orderly marketing managed by the 
colonial powers, that had ensured generous profits, was more difficult to arrange as the 
new countries into which the old empires had broken up competed with one another. A 
degree of diversification was attempted; for instance Africa expanded coffee production. 
'9ar Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 9, 1989, p. 56. 
13Harlan Cleveland and Mochtar Lubis. 1M. The Future of Develo~menl. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
The African coffee was of lower quality than that of Brazil and Colombia, but when 
vaporized into instant (another technical innovation) the quality of the original bean 
made little difference. 
To appreciate the novelty of this state of affairs, recall the very different track of 
Canadian development.14 Starting back in the 17th century a series of staples were 
produced for the European market, beaver skins for the hats worn by the Paris nobility 
being the first. Trade went on to other furs than beaver, to wood and wood products, to 
wheat, to base metals, each step furnishing the capital for the next step and for textile 
and other secondary industries. The technical advances that have now devalued the LDC 
staples make the Canadian development route obsolete. Raw materials could no longer 
serve to provide the capital for industrialization. To pessimists in the Third World the 
way forward was blocked, and at the same time reversion to the immemorial subsistence 
farming that preceded the colonial period could hardly be a goal of modem elites. 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR 
Development has meant specialization from the time of Adam Smith onwards. In 
application to Africa, the Senegalese peasant can use his precious land and scarce water 
to raise peanuts, sell the crop at international prices, and buy millet or wheat that he 
needs to feed himself and his family, and be better off than if he was self-sufficient and 
raised his own grain. The Somali peasant can similarly be better off (in peacetime) 
selling livestock and bananas and buying cereal rather than raising cereal directly. 
Through international markets each region would derive the maximum advantage of its 
geographic and other assets. 
The case for this has seemed unanswerable ever since Ricardo. Yet again and again 
in the course of the last two centuries it has been opposed as a policy. It dominated 
British economic thought once Britain had outdistanced all other countries in 
manufactures, but it found little resonance in the countries that were trailing. Alexander 
Hamilton1' in the United States argued that the classic theory did not allow for 
structural change, and the United States was high tariff from the start until the 1930s. 
And just 50 years after Hamilton's Re~ort,  ~ i s t ' ~  advanced the same argument in 
Germany, essentially that free trade is right for a country that has already industrialized, 
wrong for one that is just starting on the path. Canadian protectionism started as far 
back as Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy in the 1870s, and only in recent decades 
has it been jettisoned. 
"This is a thumbnail sketch of the conclusions of Canada's great economic historian, Harold A. Innis, 
in a series of classic volumes, starting with The Fur Trade in Canada, University of Toronto Press, 2nd 
Revised Edition, 1956. 
"~lexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, made to the United States Congress in 1791. 
16Friederich Lit .  1841 (18851. The National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans, Green and 
Co. 
Today the classical view of the benefits of free trade prevails in the influential 
international agencies: 
The favorable performance of countries which adopted outward-oriented 
policies served to make trade liberalization, broadly understood, a central 
condition for World Bank lending." 
The peasant would certainly benefit from the division of labor if he received the 
international price. But after the goods are out of his sight, on their way abroad through 
Dakar or Mogadishu, he can expect the international price he has or will receive to be 
subject to some deductions. The government will take a share in the form of export tax, 
and there will be other less formal deductions by wholesalers and traders along the way, 
in addition to genuine transport costs. Devices that prevent the benefit of the division 
of labor from going to the peasant include an artificial value of the currency, tariffs on 
goods entering the country, exorbitant bank charges--so that the peasant can end up 
hungry--even when the country is at peace. And this hunger, artificially induced by policy, 
ends by pushing the peasant to the city, where his productivity is lower than it would have 
been had he not been driven off the land by inequitable treatment. 
This matter has a place in the present argument because it contributes to the 
inequality that I will argue is a hindrance to economic advance, and the inequality makes 
for social instability. And it has a place also because when Western consultants show the 
gains from the international division of labor they tend to disregard the allocation of 
those gains within the Third World society. 
OTHER WAYS OF RAISING CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT--BORROWING 
Having little surplus from raw material sales on the terms of trade prevailing after 
World War 11, the LDCs borrowed capital for development in the 1960s and 1970s, 
setting up infrastructure and building import-replacing industries with the proceeds. 
Plentiful capital in the world at the time ensured moderate interest rates. Capital 
available increased further from 1973 with the rise in oil prices; those petrodollars 
deposited in American and German banks were freely loaned to and freely borrowed by 
the LDCs. 
By the 1980s, after they were heavily committed to the loans and had no means of 
liquidating them, demand for capital increased in the world without any increase in 
savings; long-term interest rates rose everywhere, so that as the debts were rolled over 
the LDC obligations increased without their receiving any net new funding. 
It is all very well to see that as the operation of impersonal markets, but this is hard 
to explain to the LDCs. The United States budget deficit is no small contributor to high 
long-term interest rates everywhere. U.S. citizens save too little to provide the funds 
I7Rudiger Dornbusch. 1992. The case for trade liberalization in developing countries. The Journal of 
Economic Persvectives 6(1), p. 70. 
needed by their government, so its financing falls to the rest of the world. Among other 
effects this puts the U.S. in direct competition with the LDCs for loan funds. 
A distinguished British journal1* joins in the resulting outcry: "the [US] federal 
government outspends its revenues by between $150,000 million and twice as much, 
depending on how (and by whom) the arithmetic is done." And now, it says, we are 
threatened with a budget settlement between the President and Congress that would have 
been the solution a few years back, but with the slowing of the economy is extremely 
dangerous for the U.S. and the world. 'The United States would find a serious recession 
uncomfortable, but many among the rest of us would find it calamitous as well." 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
In Latin America Raul Prebisch argued for import substitution against the liberal 
views of Jacob Viner, Gottfried Haberler and others. One cannot escape the fact that: 
Import substitution meant the development of domestic industry behind a high 
protective barrier of tariffs, quotas and licenses19 
and the result is a less productive economy than with an open trading system. Behind 
Prebisch's somewhat fanciful notions of center and periphery, of "development dialectics", 
of the "hegemonic domination" of the transnational corporation," there lies a sense that 
the rules of the game played between the First and the Third World are somehow biassed 
against the latter--not against their elites, but against their poorer members. 
Prebisch and the Third World generally gain this impression not from one feature 
of the history, but from the succession. That is what I have tried to trace in this 
introductory part of the paper: first colonialism that altered the LDC economies to the 
export of tropical raw materials, then the devaluation of those materials by the invention 
of substitutes, then the tempting offers of cheap loans for investment, succeeded by the 
rise of interest rates after the borrowed money had been committed to investment. 
These might be treated as temporary and incidental injustice at the worst, to be tolerated 
until the entire population has risen to affluence, except for the surprising power that the 
poor members are beginning to show in a number of countries. Prebisch believes @age 
44) that the answer is a synthesis of socialism and liberalism, but he is not clear on just 
how this would work. Like other leftist writers in the literature of protest, he has lost 
much of his following with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. 
"Nature. Vol. 347, 11 October 1990. 
*aul Prebiich. 1983. The Latin-American periphery in the global system of capitalism. Pages 30-51 in 
Shigeto Tsuru, ed., Human Resources. Emvloynent and Unem~lovment. London: Macmillan. 
As economic understanding increased:' most of the LDCs changed to policies that 
were relatively liberal, reducing tariffs and administrative hindrances to trade, and at least 
in principle abandoning import-replacement to aim at an export-oriented economy. The 
Government of India ceased trying to take over physically "the commanding heights of 
the economy," starting with the steel industry, a policy earlier fostered by Nehm and 
Mahalanobis. 
If borrowing, say in the form of selling bonds, had become too expensive for the 
Third World, direct investment was still possible. That had been urged in the 1950s and 
1960s, but at that time the newly-freed countries feared neo-colonialism. With the failure 
of alternative ways of raising capital, and a generation coming to power with fewer 
complexes from the indignities of the colonial experience, and a worldwide swing towards 
liberalism, the Third World opened to branch plants of the multi-nationals. 
Now that the LDCs have swallowed their apprehensions and made liberal policies 
their own, including promise of repatriation of capital and interest, they should have 
access to the plentiful direct investment held out to them only a few years back. But the 
world of finance had changed in the meantime. The same worldwide capital shortage 
that raised interest rates and kept increasing their indebtedness reappeared in the limited 
capacity of the multi-national concerns to set up plants, and coincided with more intense 
competition among LDC countries for these plants. 
Thus just as we have convinced the LDCs that what they need is our funds invested 
by free enterprise in unplanned market economies, we have to limit our participation. 
With capital scarce in the world, the new demands from Eastern Europe and the USSR 
could make it scarcer yet. The Banzkok is one of hundreds of papers in Asia and 
Latin America to voice concern: 
In many countries of the developing world, hope for the future is tinged with 
the fear that while the countries of Eastern Europe are being dragged into the 
market mechanisms of the industrialized world, those of the developing world 
will become sidelined. This fear takes its most potent form in a scenario in 
which the industrialized states eventually band together to maintain their own 
prosperity in the face of the increasing poverty of Third World Countries. 
All that leaves just one possibility: the LDCs will have to secure capital through the 
surplus generated in their own production: 
... since the days of plentiful credit are gone, attention must shift to productivity 
gains as the source of g r o ~ t h . ~  
llRepeating this conventional statement gives me trouble, because I do not believe that Alexander 
Hamilton and Friederich List were ignorant. 
% quoted in The International Herald Tribune of September 10, 1990, p. 8. 
2JDornb~sCh, OD. cit., pp. 69-70. 
Though investment funds are not now as great as they were, yet some do exist and 
some investment is coming to the Third World horn abroad, bringing its own physical 
capital, management and access to markets. That makes for efficient production indeed, 
in the sense of output per person employed in the plant. But efficiency can be defined 
in a broader sense, to be discussed later. Here I say only that efficiency in the narrow 
sense was the method of the Shah of Iran, while a broader notion of efficiency animated 
Japanese industrial policy. 
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 
Intellectual property is another matter on which the First World policies seem to 
the Third World less than altruistic. 
For the advanced country copyright is essential to stimulate invention in everything 
from software to engineering and medicine, not to mention music and literature. For the 
less advanced it seems a way of withholding such inventions, or at best of charging a high 
price for an invisible and intangible entity. The dilemma facing the First World is well 
put by John Armstrong, Vice-President for Science and Technology at IBM: 
Without an intellectual property regime that provides an opportunity for us 
and for others to gain a return on our various investments, our R & D 
spending would be both less efficient and less in absolute 
If one is not well enough off to pay the fees then the insistence on copyright has all the 
marks of a malicious withholding, a dog-in-the-manger attitude. 
When questions arose about tightening regulations on intellectual property at a 
meeting related to GATT, Carlos Braga of Brazil 
expressed concern about the impacts on developing countries ... in areas such as 
pharmaceuticals because of the impact on consumer prices.2s 
There is surely enough goodwill on the part of the rich countries that free or nearly 
free copying of books, software, even pharmaceuticals and other copyright materials 
would be permitted, all as part of foreign aid, except for one circumstance. That is that 
the holder of the copyright would have no feasible way of preventing the copies from 
circulating back to the rich countries that provide the royalties that are the return to the 
inventors and those who back them. 
WHAT NEW INVENTIONS WILL THERE BE? 
If there is little profit in inventing industrial procedures suited to the ample labor 
supplies of the less developed countries, then these will not come into existence in First 
%News Re~ort of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, February-March 1992, 
p. 15. 
=Newsletter of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, May/June 1990. 
World laboratories, and this has enormous consequences for the route of development 
being followed by the LDCs. 
Another application of the same principle is the fighting of disease in the Third 
World, still serious, in some aspects more serious than ever. It costs many millions of 
dollars to create, develop, test and merchandise a new pharmaceutical, one estimate I 
have seen being $100 million. Only large firms can undertake it, and they can only do 
so when they have a prospect of profitable sales. Rare diseases are not (commercially) 
worth working on, and common diseases that affect mostly poor people are equally 
unattractive. That is a main reason why so little progress has been made against malaria, 
river blindness, schistosomiasis, and other African scourges. Can the corporations be 
blamed for this? Not at all; like so many other features of the modem world, good and 
bad, this one is impersonally controlled by the market process. 
Even if the poor can be brought to understand why it is that new research on their 
ailments cannot be financed, it is entirely beyond them why they cannot have access to 
existing medicaments. Just as for any other intellectual property, why not give them the 
legal right to copy pharmaceuticals, as well as photocopy books, to use software? If we 
are serious about wanting their development, what easier way is there for us to provide 
help, and at virtually no cost, since the benefits would go to countries that could not 
afford to pay copyright prices in any case? 
The answer is the same as before: the one thing that the inventors could not accept 
is these products drifting back to into the markets of the rich countries. And there is no 
way of sealing frontiers to their transport. 
THE ENVIRONMENT--ANOTHER STUMBLING  BLOCK?'^ 
On top of all this come environmental difficulties, for which the LDCs seem 
unprepared both economically and politically. 
Brazil, with its huge foreign debt, needs the World Bank. But the Bank is 
facing pressure from conservationists to withhold funds until Brazil reins in 
Amazon development. While the Bank tries to steer clear of the politics, 
Brazilians, trying to bolster their economy, are fed up with the 
 environmentalist^.^' 
We need not be surprised at Brazil's reaction--Canada reacted in much the same way 
when U.S. conservationists came up to protest against the killing of baby seals, whose 
pelts are a significant Canadian export. 
One of the most articulate speakers for the Third World in this field is Mahathir 
Mohamad, long-time Prime Minister of Malaysia, who complains about the "undue focus 
%m, "In Chile, Protests Over Saving the Forest", October 4, 1990, p. 3. 
w o r l d  Development Forum, Vol. 7, NO. 9, May 15, 1989, p. 1. 
on the tropical forest." When eight foreigners chained themselves to cranes and barges 
loading logs in Sarawak, the government news agency described their action as "a war 
against ~ a l a ~ s i a . " ~  
Herman Daly puts the issue well: 
Now that the Brazilians have learned to beat us at our own game of 
growthmanship, it seems ungracious to declare that game obsolete. We can 
sympathize with Brazilian disbelief and suspicion regarding the motives of the 
neo-Malthusians. But the dialectic of change has no rule against irony.29 
In Robert Dorfman's authoritative runthrough of development t h e 0 9  we find a 
due recognition of environmental questions, and what I interpret as repudiation of the 
Rostow ~ptimism.~' For the latter, as long as there are no wars, including no revival 
of the Cold War, strong economic growth in the rich countries with minimal trade 
restrictions, some attention to the environment, development will proceed to completion, 
at least for most countries outside of Subsaharan Africa. Dorfman is more realistic--he 
can't share Rostow's complacent confidence that the environment will be able 
to stand high mass consumption by the 11.2 billion inhabitants that he 
[Rostow] foresees on the planet by the middle of the [21st] century.32 
I fully share the doubt expressed by Dorfman, and in this paper would add one further 
doubt. This is a serious obstacle whichever of the two routes of development outlined 
at the end of this paper is followed. It would take a separate paper even to present the 
issues raised by environment questions, and I will mention only one aspect that shows the 
difference of perspective between the First and the Third Worlds. 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL CONTAMINATION 
In the rush for development it is easy to neglect ecological consequences, and 
certainly Britain and the United States gave little attention to the effects of what they 
were doing on their own long-term welfare. Destroying the forests to make coke for iron 
manufacture, blackening the air, was progress in 19th century England; now it is 
destruction. It is not forgotten that enslaving, even killing, the native peoples, was alright 
when Westerners did it, but now the West is scandalized by the treatment of the 
- 
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Yanomani in the Amazon. How can the First World explain to the Third why we have 
become so much more humane in the 20th century than we were in the 19th? 
THE HIDDEN DEBT OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
In any extended discussion on environment between LDC and MDC representatives 
it is sure to emerge that Brazil and Indonesia, in cutting their forests, in burning fossil 
fuels, are doing exactly what Britain and the United States did when they were in the 
same stage of development. Everyone admits that if all interference with the 
environment is forbidden then there will be no development at all, indeed no economy, 
and that applied 100 years ago as it does today. 
In principle all should be able to agree to take the perspective of an earlier time, 
say 1900, or further back yet, to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. From the 
perspective of that moment zero of world development, the planet could stand so much 
carbon (for example) without any appreciable climate change. That initial degree of 
absorptive tolerance can be seen as a bank account. The industrial countries put so much 
carbon into the atmosphere, and thus used up so much of the total credit balance. 
Simplifying somewhat, and disregarding uncertainties on the facts, if the atmosphere 
could stand x gigatons of carbon, and y have been put into it by the North in the course 
of its industrialization, then there is only x-y left. Call y a hidden debt that has been 
incurred by the North? If the amount of pollution that can take place without 
irreversible damage is a bank account belonging to all humanity, then it can be said that 
we have withdrawn far more than our share, and should somehow compensate the Third 
World. 
It is hard to imagine this tune playing well in Washington, even though it ties in with 
the notion of polluting rights that is at the moment popular. Starting the clock at the 
present is certainly unfair to the Third World, but starting at any earlier time will be 
unacceptable to the First World. 
GENERAL INTEREST IN THE LDCs DECLINES 
After World War I1 the air was full of goodwill on the part of the First World 
towards the Third. Now the Western interest and concern for the LDCs seem to be 
declining. James Speth, President of the World Resources Institute of Washington, D.C., 
reports "foreign aid's eroding consensus". He quotes the Chairman of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on the "fear factor", that a pro-foreign aid 
vote could hurt a Congressman's re-election prospects.33 Far from discussing increased 
aid, Jim Hoagland proposes 
a reappraisal of why and where aid money goes in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America ... It is time to make genuine political reform a condition for receiving 
aJames Speth. 1m. WRI Issues and Ideas (March), p. 1. 
economic and military assistance from the nations and institutions of the 
developed world." 
And whatever aid is given has a far from altruistic objective: 
the French ... in North Africa, the United States in Mexico and Central 
America ... face a huge volume of unwanted migration if economic and political 
conditions dramatically worsen... , 35 
so to prevent a flood of immigrants we should be generous with development aid, just as 
West Germany was generous with aid to East Germany to enable the latter to develop 
quickly and offer its residents jobs at home. 
Speth goes on to speak of the possibility of a 
closing down of US concern with the developing countries at the precise 
moment when what is needed for them and for us is a revitalization of that 
concern.36 
As a subject of scholar1 research, says David L. Featherman, President of the Social 
Science Research Council: 4' 
The Ford Foundation correctly diagnosed a declining emphasis on foreign 
research--and on the prerequisite linguistic skills and area knowledge--in 
graduate programs of the more quantitatively oriented social science 
disciplines ... It also detected a trend, corroborated in our own records 
of ... dissertation fellowships, away from research about the developing countries. 
PROGRESS IN THE THIRD WORLD 
The 1970s and 1980s have by and large been decades of progress for many parts of 
the Third World despite hesitating international trade. The LDCs of East Asia went 
from an average income (GNP per capita) of $180 US dollars in 1970 to $520 in 1990 
(both at 1987 prices). Multiplying real income by nearly threefold, and mostly without 
the help of oil, during 20 years is no small achievement. South Asia did less well, moving 
only from $240 to $330--which is to say starting higher than East Asia and ending lower. 
%Jim Hoagland, writing in the Washineon Post quoted in World Development Forum, Vol. 8, No. 18, 
October 15, 1990, p. 4. 
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And Latin America started much higher, at $1350, and climbed proportionately less 
to $1680. At the extreme, Africa south of the Sahara rose not at all--was $290 in 1970 
and after some fluctuation was the same again in 1990. 
RESPONSE TO PROGRESS 
Among the countries that made what looks like real progress was Iran under the 
Shah. Let us disregard here the democracy and human rights sides of the Shah regime, 
for the new rulers who brought him down are even less attentive to these issues. The 
Shah went excessively for import substitution, now seen as the wrong path, but again we 
do not blame him for following what was the fashion of his time. 
His economic policies seemed on the whole to be accepted internally and approved 
by outside observers. Says one of these, assessing the achievements of the Shah's regime: 
the goal of using oil to build a self-sustaining economic structure, which is set 
out in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Development Plans, has been espoused by 
successive governments and by contending political groups.38 
This was written some months after the Shah had been toppled, and the new regime, 
under the Ayatollah Khomeini, had taken over the reins of government.' That was a good 
time to survey the gains of the Shah's regime. Lieberman continued: 
Iran now produces a wide range of consumer durables and nondurables, along 
with certain ... capital goods. Progress has been noteworthy in the production 
of textiles, shoes, vehicles, tires, and electrical machinery for industrial and 
nonindustrial use. The integrated iron and steel mill in Isfahan, a heavy 
machine tool plant and aluminum smelting plant in Arak, the tractor factory 
in Tabriz .... 
And the social side was not neglected: 
gains in the literacy, health, and security of the population, and specifically in 
the status and well-being of women should be noted. 
What LDC would not envy these achievements, admittedly due to oil but with excellent 
prospects that before oil deposits were exhausted the economy would have taken off. 
The writer thought that some small changes might take place under the new regime, 
especially in the direction of more support for small fanning, but on the whole he took 
for granted that the main track established by the Shah would be followed. No need here 
to recount how wrong that has proven to be; Islamic fundamentalism is established there 
for the indefinite future. 
3amuel S. Lieberman. 1979. Prospects for development and population growth in Iran. Po~ulation and 
Development Review 5(2). 
That Iran should be among the first countries to have fallen off the development 
track is especially remarkable given that its economy has been one of the most successful. 
By 1980 it had attained an income per capita of over $2000 current dollars, as against 
$380 in 1970. During the same decade its population grew from 28 to 38 million. It was 
not without an elite that took a considerable share of the benefits of development, but 
much of what the elite took went in turn into development projects. 
It has not been easy to secure detailed figures on Iran for the recent period, that has 
been complicated by the Iran-Iraq war, but clearly there has been a reversion back to 
small-scale farming, with little inclination to build on the Shah's industrial effort. 
Algeria's income per capita is not very different from Iran's and it would have 
followed Iran and substituted another ideology from that of development by now if it was 
not restrained by a firm government willing to suspend democratic institutions. That 
government called off an election in 1992 that it was sure the fundamentalists would win, 
and it has put many of the opposition leaders in jail. Such measures disappointed 
Western governments, or so they said; one is not sure whether it was the firm action or 
the need to take firm action that they were protesting about. The Algerian public largely 
opposes the drastic measures taken, but so far the current regime remains in the saddle. 
Indonesia is not as well off as either of these, with an income per capita that at its 
peak reached $610 current dollars per capita (1983), and yet it too is under considerable 
pressure from the fundamentalists. The Economist comments on 
the country [being] 88 percent Muslim--and increasingly conscious of the 
fact.39 
Some observers fear that the nonideological and more or less secular leaders now in 
charge will have to apply increasing force to prevent the country from falling off the 
development track as Iran has done and Algeria would do. 
Fundamentalism has been the subject of a major research project sponsored by the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and based in the University of Chicago's 
Divinity School under Martin Marty that is providing a better understanding of "why they 
have sprung up with such force at the end of the 20th century, and what they hope to 
achieve." 
The movements ... aim either for political power or to change society in some 
radical respect ... All see themselves as 'fighting back', using violence if 
necessary, against the forces of secularism and modernism. ... Foremost among 
fundamentalists aspiration is a 'return' to 'family values', with women as 
mothers and housewives and men as the principal or only breadwinners ... 
Causes of the new religious activism include the collapse of Marxism, the 
-he Economist, March 13, 1993, p. 65. 
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failure of national governments to honour promises made after independence, 
and the emergence of a world market ... Fundamentalist ideologies ... stress social 
justice and the redistribution of wealth!* 
Fundamentalist religion is the most articulate of the ways in which disillusionment 
is showing itself. Innumerable tribal conflicts in Africa, wars like the three between India 
and Pakistan, or that between India and China, or Iraq and Iran, or the civil war that has 
raged in the north of Sri Lanka, all have the appearance of diversions, taken up when for 
whatever reason the basic task of development seems too difficult, too protracted, or for 
some other reason too unrewarding. As a minimum we can say that development in the 
direction now going forward is not the unique popular objective. 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Proofs abound that unemployment cannot occur in a genuine free economy. Alfred 
Sauvy proves the proposition with a circular flow argument42 that I find convincing 
enough. Yet the more convincing in logic such an argument is the more the situation 
demands that we search for the mechanism that creates the unemployment we see 
actually existing. 
Leontiev shows statistically that each boom registers more unemployment than the 
previous boom, and each trough more than the previous trough. Can this upward trend 
be the outcome of violations of the conditions for a free economy, such as minimum 
wages and monopoly prices? Many think so, while others, including Keynes, sought some 
specific mechanism that would operate even in the absence of any such constraints on the 
free market. He believed he had found it in the benefits of liquidity to holders of capital, 
that keeps the market interest rate higher than the marginal productivity of capital. 
Putting it crudely there are profits to be had in financial operations that make money too 
expensive for the marginal producer. Money passed among speculators has fallen out of 
the productive system; it does not buy goods whose production would employ people. 
When he spoke of liquidity preference Keynes thought of money passing among 
wealthy capitalists in London, but surely the same applies in a poor Indonesian village 
or city. If people are willing to borrow for their private consumption at 50 percent per 
year, or much higher, then one who wants to set up a textile operation, even using local 
materials, has to be very sure before he starts that he will have something left over after 
paying wages and 50 percent on the cost of his initial setup. Lawgivers know all this, and 
they pass usury laws, but as I have myself witnessed in the Canadian Civil Service, these 
are not easy to enforce." 
42Alfred Sauvy. 1980. La Machine et le Chomage. Paris: Dunod. 
431n my time civil servants typically spent their month's salaries well before the next payday. When a week 
before the end of the month someone had an unexpected visit from a relative or other domestic need the 
emergency had to be met by borrowing, say $50, from the usurer in the next office. The borrower would 
actually receive only $45, and a week later pay back $50. Because of the special character of this market, the 
Whatever the reason, no one can deny that "unemployment plagues most 20th 
century economie~. '~ Whether in North Africa or in South Asia, the availability of 
purchased (not homemade) physical capital is crucial for employment. This is the more 
true the more the world is a single integrated market. A country that has a billion dollars 
to invest, and needs to spend ten thousand dollars abroad to create one employment slot 
in its modem sector (plus the domestic capital component required), will be able to 
provide for a hundred thousand new entrants into its labor market and no more. 
India tried to circumvent the constraints by itself producing the physical capital 
needed for development. In principle this is the answer; if the village carpenter using 
local wood constructs the loom on which the housewife weaves her cotton saris then there 
is no need to depend on the outside world for the capital needed in this activity. What 
has the most serious effort for the Third World is not only that physical capital has 
mostly to be bought abroad, but that its labor saving quality is determined by the cost of 
labor in the major markets, which are the developed countries. 
The amount of funds being limited, if some unit of capital is required for opening 
each slot for a new member of the labor force, then it is the limits of financial capital 
that causes the unemployment. It is this limited amount of capital controlled in a 
centralized fashion (public or private) that permits some fraction of the labor force to be 
rather well paid, and leaves the remainder of the labor force outside!' Better than to 
speak of the people who are left out of the formal economy as unemployed, is to refer 
to them as workers in the dual or the informal economy. 
WHAT KEEPS A COUNTRY ON THE TRACK OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS? 
My thesis will be that what keeps a country on the track is the choice it makes in 
the first place between two versions of development. Let us call one high technology, the 
other low, the first aiming at efficiency in international markets, the latter aiming at the 
highest level of efficiency compatible with full employment. 
The temptation to follow the high technology track is strong. At every stage, as we 
saw, the West has conquered, outwitted, subordinated, the LDCs by means of its 
technology. The entire history of the relations between the First World and the Third 
World gives the appearance that the more advanced technology will always beat the low 
tech. In case the Third World has forgotten that, the Gulf War was a refresher. 
interest was the same whatever time during the month the money was borrowed, so we count that as a rate 
of "only" 10 percent per month, not per week. Even so, this money changing could outbid all but the most 
profitable real enterprise seeking capital. Usury laws making such transactions illegal only made them more 
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The whole configuration puts the dignity of the LDC on the line. Its sensitivity 
heightened by decades or centuries of colonial rule, it tends to shun production methods 
that are not the best. 
And yet experience is showing that the high tech line will lead to inequality, to 
massive unemployment, and ultimately to an upset of the whole development structure. 
If East Asia leads in the GNP race; if it has less unemployment than elsewhere; if it is 
socially more stable; that is above all because for the most part it has chosen technologies 
that would make the maximum use of its labor. Employment translates into participation 
in the economy and the society, and that above all is what people want; they do not want 
development that is carried out by others, even if they believe--which would be naive-- 
that it is all being done for them. 
The multinational corporation that sets up in a distant part of the world can afford 
to make little concession to the wish of the local people for participation. It knows only 
one way to produce, and it brings in the equipment for that from the advanced country 
where it has gained its management and other production skills. Local wages are low-- 
that is why it has come--but nonetheless the fewer it hires the greater its efficiency, and 
the less the interaction with the locals. Without wanting to it contributes to the distinction 
between a formal sector in which workers are relatively well-paid and working with 
advanced capital equipment, and an informal sector of all those who are left out and 
have to struggle on their own with virtually no capital at all. 
The foreign multinational has no reason to consider equalitarian issues in the host 
question--to do so could be interpreted as interference. In any case it is not their 
business. But it is the business of the governments of the Third World, who dispose of 
certain amounts of financial capital, and can invest them where the good of the country 
as a whole requires. The most that can be said is that some do and some do not; the one 
thing that all governments have in common is that it is not easy for them to stand against 
the interests of influential private citizens, even when these directly conflict with the 
interests of the country. 
PARTICIPATION, EQUALITY, JUSTICE 
A heated discussion is now going on in many parts of the world, revolving around 
the concept of "justice". Does "development" mean that some few people become visibly 
and ostentatiously very rich, those people including foreigners or persons of alien religion 
or in some other respect socially unqualified for wealth? Does it mean that the honest 
majority are left with only the not-very-credible promise that they too will be rich some 
day if only they will work hard and be patient? 
One can appreciate the response of those left out: better not to have development 
if it means only wealth for a few, and they are the wrong people, and just waiting for the 
rest of us. If we are to be poor anyhow, then it is better to be poor in an orderly 
traditional fashion, and at least enjoy the support of traditional religion and remain in 
harmony with traditional norms of justice. 
AVERAGES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
The kind of study I am here attempting is seriously handicapped by lack of data on 
distributions. There is plentiful detail, careful definition and infii te refinement on Gross 
National Product, on GNP per capita, on imports and exports of various commodities, 
on real earnings per employee in manufacturing. These matters of total and average are 
not unimportant, but one could study them for a long time in the Shah's Iran and in the 
Mexico of the same period, and not tumble to the impending revolution in the one, and 
the relative stability in the other. 
There are purposes for which rough indications on distribution would be of more 
use than precise data on averages. 
PROMISES AND PLANS 
Promises should buy time in which the more painful phases of development could 
be accomplished, but in fact they exchange for very little. They are a coin everywhere 
debased in these days of ambitious politicians using modem means of communication. 
Making promises more credible occupies a good deal of the attention of many LDC 
governments. National development plans started out as a sincere if naive sketch of the 
intended route of growth, describing what was actually intended to be done in the next 
five or twenty-five years to bring the nation closer to the developed condition. They 
included a capital budget to announce the direction of industrial expansion, equivalent 
to what in France or Japan is "industrial policy", except that the State component was 
usually larger. 
From that start there has been a steady evolution of the planning process to make 
it less a serious outline of effort to be taken than a promise of results. The national 
Plans are admitted to be political documents, intended for public relations rather than 
for that coordination between the various components that they started out to be. 
We go on to routes of development, that have been very much the subject of 
consultation between rich and poor countries during the postwar years, and on which the 
bias of western industrialists and consultants tends to be, not surprisingly, on the side that 
comes out of their experience and knowledge. 
THE TWO ROUTES O F  DEVELOPMENT 
1) THE ROUTE O F  LABOR-SAVING CAPITAL 
After a history in which the First World's use of technology had so disadvantaged 
the Third World, it was natural that the LDCs should see our high technology factories 
as their best defence and means of advance. But they ask whether it is necessary for them 
to travel the path by which we arrived at them, in which miserably paid laborers engaged 
for long hours in work that was both strenuous and boring. Why not jump immediately 
to modern methods of production, come directly into the late 20th century? Invite 
foreign corporations to establish branch plants; use all available local capital to found 
plants using the latest technologies. Little need be said about this; it is being followed in 
the Philippines, in Thailand, and up to a dozen years ago in Iran. 
2) THE ROUTE OF LABOR-INTENSIVE INDUSTRY WITH GRADUALLY 
RISING PRODUCTIVITY 
Yet even if capital was much cheaper and more available than it is this route of 
development still has a fatal defect: it does too little for employment. It is development 
that leaves out most of the population for what could be the indefinite 'future. The part 
left out is all the greater if the birth rates remain high. Much better to control births, 
and so lessen the number in the next generation for which jobs will have to be found, and 
stretch existing capital resources to the utmost so that the productivity of all citizens will 
benefit. The aim ought to be in the first place an equalitarian distribution of increases 
in productivity. 
That is the way that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea proceeded, starting about 
1950. They started by putting people to work, and whatever small amounts of capital 
could be mobilized went to that end. High tech was not even thought about. The initial 
work in these countries, as in any poor society, was necessarily of low productivity and 
mostly in agriculture. But the most important thing to say about that initial step was that 
universal participation was the all important goal. 
After full employment was attained, in a relatively equalitarian labor force, attention 
could be given to raising productivity. This second phase still did not reach what we 
would could call high tech, and it was not allowed to disturb the equalitarian wage 
structure. 
In what I call the third phase it becomes possible to move into advanced technology. 
Still no purchase of turnkey factories from Europe and the United States, complete with 
manuals that told the managers what to do. Nothing was imported from abroad just to 
be used as it was; rather individual machines were imported to be studied by engineers, 
modified and improved where possible, and then installed and put to intensive use, 
perhaps 24 hours a day. Those heavy roadmaking machines from the United States used 
an hour or two a day and the rest of the day standing by the side of the road were not 
seen in Japan. 
Among those who have expounded this equalitarian full-employment route of 
development none has written more convincingly than the distinguished Japanese 
economist Harry Oshima. 
Based on the experience of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the 
transformation into an industrial society can be related to the growth in 
productivity as follows: with rapid and sustained growth in gross domestic 
product per worker exceeding the growth of the labor force, these countries 
began to approach full employment. The rise in product per worker took the 
form initially of rises in the annual product per family in the agricultural 
sector, as yield per hectare rose with increased multiple cropping, and as 
income from nonfarm work during the slack periods expanded. With the 
sustained rise in product per worker exceeding the growth of the labor force, 
full employment in the rural sector was attained, and, as wages rose, peasants 
began to buy labor-saving equipment and machines. At the same time, the 
increase in the purchasing power of the peasantry (the largest segment of the 
population in the early period of the transition) induced expansion of import- 
substituting industries, especially textiles, which led to increased employment 
opportunities in urban areas. More jobs were created as labor-intensive 
exports began to make headway in the world market and as industrial 
productivity rose with better utilization of capacity and scale economies.46 
The advantages of this second route are several. Starting with full employment it 
ensures that the most valuable productive asset--the country's labor force--would not be 
wasted and demoralized through idleness and exclusion. Not importing whole factories 
but only individual machines, it did not incur heavy indebtedness abroad. Being 
equalitarian it did not disturb social stability. 
With all those advantages why is it not universally chosen? That is a social and 
political question, not an economic one. For one thing it does not (at the outset) produce 
showpiece supermodern factories that awe visitors. For another the preexisting elite has 
no reason to favor an equal distribution of the benefits of development. That the existing 
elite should want some goods for themselves, that they should want to live in luxury, is 
understandable and does not do much harm; that the elite should distort the whole 
process of development in its own interest is more difficult to pardon. 
Yet this last is what happens when a country initiates automobile and aircraft 
manufacture, and buys from abroad fully automatic textile mills, leaving a good part of 
its population picking up cigarette butts to gain a few pennies. It is argued that the new 
production methods will diffuse from the aircraft plant, but in fact such plants are 
enclaves, communicating very little with the country as a whole. They simply cannot 
diffuse without large amounts of capital. 
In fact there should be nothing new or surprising in Route 2 - 4  merely applies the 
elementary principles of economizing. Given initial quantities and qualities of land, labor 
and capital, the strategy is to make use of all of them. To place all that capital on a few 
high tech plants and to leave some of the land and much of the labor unused cannot be 
optimum. 
Is not the informal sector in a country like the Philippines, then, just doing what the 
whole economy is doing in the labor route that is here recommended? In fact there is 
a crucial difference. If whatever capital is available goes to the formal sector and the 
informal gets almost none and no leadership it remains stagnant. Japan devoted much 
of its capital to raising productivity at the very lowest activities. The point seems to be 
that the workers in a shoe factory or a pottery plant can become more productive with 
a little capital, and with a little guidance, than if they are wholly neglected. 
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THE LABOR-INTENSIVE VERSUS THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY ROUTES 
That the issue is very much alive today is suggested by a recent article on Indonesia. 
It contrasts the position of the technocrats, westem-trained economists, who despite the 
appellation favor the labor-intensive approach, as against BJ. Habibie, who was a high 
technology executive in Germany: 
The [economists] have pursued a low-technology, export-oriented economy, 
exploiting the country's low labor costs. Their chief ideological opponent is BJ. 
Habibie, an ambitious enthusiast for a high technology approach--which is 
likely to require large subsidies and protection against import?' 
In a perfect world, in which there was plenty of capital looking for investment 
possibilities, where inventiveness of foreign owners of capital was available to create new 
instruments of production that would use the plentiful labor of the LDCs, in which the 
option of reversion to tradition and fundamentalist religion did not present itself to large 
numbers of the frustrated, one might argue against what I have called Route 2 as the 
preferred strategy of development. Plentiful capital would flow to the points where labor 
was abundant, and there would be no major unemployment problem. (Though even in 
this ideal situation economics does not have much to say about what would happen to 
income distribution; it could be very wide.) 
In the actual world the LDCs, especially those of large populations, have little real 
option if they are to engage the participation of their populations. Without such 
engagement the cause of modernization is lost. 
My point has little to do with political ideology. Thus Oshima gives Japan, in ruins 
at the end of World War 11, as the prime example of a country following this path. He 
speaks of South Korea and Taiwan as other examples. Now China comes close to it. The 
Philippines does not, and its government and society are notoriously unstable. And Iran 
did not, with an outcome that we know, that could not be prevented by an enormous oil 
subsidy and relative success in raising average income. 
THREE CLOCKS ARE TICKING 
If development, however beautiful it may ultimately make the world and the lives 
of its inhabitants, has to be taken on trust for more than a certain length of time, then 
the ordinary people on which it depends will give up. The events in Iran and Algeria, 
perhaps tomorrow in Egypt and Indonesia, suggest a time constraint on development. 
Three clocks are ticking, of which the first two are well-known: 
1) The population clock; development will indeed bring a stationary population, but 
each year of delay adds something like 1.8 percent to the planetary population and makes 
development more difficult; will population growth check the development that would 
halt population growth? 
- ~ 
"The Economist, March 13, 1993, p. 66. 
2) The environment clock; in the model presented by Peter ~ o g e r s , ~  and for which 
there is some empirical support, the damage to the environment is considerable at the 
start of development, gradually rises to a peak, and then diminishes after a certain 
maturity has been reached; rich societies can afford the cost of shifting to non-polluting 
sources of energy, of cleaning up rivers and the air. If the initial progress is slow and the 
period of high emission is too protracted the damage to the environment may be 
irreversible. 
3) The ~atience clock; if the track of development taken is such that the majority of 
the population cannot see benefit for themselves but only lavish benefit for a few, 
especially if these few are of alien culture or for other reason not the most admired social 
types, then they will revolt. Whether the fundamentalist revolt of Iran will be typical is 
hard to say; there are alternative ways in which a society can drop out. A society, like a 
boy at school, will drop out when most of its members do not see the exertion required 
as worth the prospective result for themselves. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE FIRST WORLD: HELP OR HINDRANCE TO THE 
THIRD WORLD? 
So at the end of all this how do I answer the question posed in the title of this 
paper? The direct help in the form of foreign aid is small in relation to a) the wealth 
of the First World, b) the needs of the Third World and c) the overhang of debt of the 
Third World. 
The challenges offered by the First World during the colonial period and since have 
left their mark on people's thinking everywhere. I refer to the tantalizing military and 
industrial superiority of the West. The residue today of our military superiority is the 
dissemination of many billions of dollars worth of weapons; if these are not the direct 
cause of the numerous conflicts on all continents, they certainly make those conflicts 
more murderous. 
On the industrial side the superiority of the West not only presents the Third World 
with a target to aim at, which is a positive element, but on the other hand suggests a 
wrong way of attaining that aim. 
That wrong way is through the example and the challenge of advanced production 
that suits the present population-capital ratios of the First World, but is wholly 
inappropriate to the ratios of the Third World. Following it in the latter bequeaths small 
enclaves of development and elsewhere exclusion and unemployment. The outcome 
would show itself clearly in statistics of distribution--if we had them rather than the 
present concentration on totals and averages. Iran and Algeria are the forerunners of 
many other countries if this path of development continues to be followed. At the end 
of the path is an alternative to the secular and humane ideology embedded in the idea 
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of development--the retreat to medieval forms of religion in the name of traditional 
justice. 
On the second path are Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and probably China. 
To put the distinction between the two paths in one sentence: the first starts with 
a concentration of the most efficient and modem capital and engages whatever personnel 
is needed to tend this capital, leaving the rest of the labor to look after itself; the second 
starts by employing all available labor, and contributing whatever capital is to be had to 
making that labor as uniformly productive as possible. The second, among many other 
advantages, leads to a more equalitarian outcome, but is very difficult to introduce if the 
preceding inequality is great. The first path is more to the taste of a pre-existing wealthy 
elite, but with modem communication operated by ambitious politicians leads to a rich 
enclave in an otherwise impoverished society, and so prepares the ground for an Iran-type 
revolution. 
At the moment of writing the Prime Minister of Pakistan is Nawaz Sharif, and he 
is attempting to reduce the President's powers. We have some information on his 
standing and his ambitions: 
Mr. Sharifs vision of himself as a Moghul emperor ... makes people jitte ry... He 
is fond of grand but wasteful building schemes ... On top of all this his family's 
business empire is already the largest in Paki~ tan .~~  
There is little evidence that Mr. Sharif plans to apply the financial capital of the State 
primarily to raising the productivity of the small farmer and artisan. Only with a wider 
distribution of political power can one hope for a distribution of disposable capital that 
would incorporate the poorer members of the society in the development process. 
Experience of recent decades makes us skeptical of such metaphors as "a rising tide raises 
all boats", or its "trickle down". 
Beyond this the most important thing to say about development and economic 
organization in general is that there ought to be the maximum competition between 
firms, the maximum cooperation and loyalty within firms. There is no writer who brings 
this out more clearly than does Ezra Vogel in his work on ~apan." I suggest that the 
right model for representing a modern economy that is working well is Little League 
baseball rather than either the maximizing of individual utility on one side or universal 
cooperation on the other. The baseball league model combining cooperation among 
members of each team with competition between teams appears in its clearest form in 
East Asia. All that is the subject of a sequel to the present paper. 
'!'The Economist, March 6-12, 1993, p. 61. 
?3ome of the ideas presented in this paper emerge from discussions with Ezra Vogel of some years back. 
He is especially interested in the social aspect of Japanese production, while Oshima concentrates on the 
purely economic. Vogel's Javan as Number 1: Lessons for Ameriq (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1979) is especially important as showing how the s d  works along with the economic; without 
appreciating the solidarity within the Japanese corporation there is no way of understanding its high 
productivity. 
